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Abstract. Trust is paramount for the effective operation of any monetary system.
While the distributed architecture of blockchain technology on which
cryptocurrencies operate has many benefits, the anonymity of users on the
blockchain has provided criminal users an opportunity to hide both their identities
and illicit activities. In this paper, we present a scoring mechanism for
cryptocurrency users where the scores represent users’ trustworthiness as safe or
risky transactors in the cryptocurrency community. In order to distinguish lawabiding users from potential threats in the Bitcoin marketplace, we analyze
historical thefts to profile transactions, classify them into risky and non-risky
categories using several machine learning techniques, and finally calculate a
reputation score for every unique user based on their past association with any
unlawful Bitcoin incident. The Support Vector Machine model based on two key
attributes produces an accuracy of 86% and is considered the most applicable for
our dataset. Our reputation score ranges from 0 to the total number of transactions
by a given user where a higher score indicates greater trustworthiness in making
Bitcoin transactions. This score helps to identify reputable users and, therefore,
acts as a guideline for safe Bitcoin transactions. In the cryptocurrency
marketplace, our self-attestation metric in the form of a reputation score offers a
foundation for enhancing trust between transacting parties.

1

Introduction

Recent advances in distributed and parallel networking using Internet-ubiquitous
accessible services are allowing a re-engineering of previously centralized system
design and authority. New shared access has created the opportunity for non-mediated
trust through the use of transparency and immutability within a public historical record.
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This record is maintained by a community of users rather than a third-party mediator
declaring what is the trusted record based on their assessment.
While this disintermediation of third-party authorities using blockchains and smart
contracts is in its early development for many applications, digital assets like
cryptocurrency have operated under a distributed model for almost a decade. The lack
of regulation brings the challenge of avoiding fraud and market manipulation in this
borderless technology. Such behavior and norm policing are traditionally handled with
sanctions and settlements by designated central authorities such as governments and
central banks.
The essential requirement for money to work is trust. Trust has worked as a pillar
for monetary exchanges at every stage of civilization starting from a barter system to
the broader aspects of a society-wide monetary system. Without trust, the honest
exchange of goods or services for currency is infeasible and cryptocurrency is no
exception in this regard. A trustworthy environment is essential for the widespread
acceptance of cryptocurrency.
Transparency is a great creator of trust and it has a long history as a tool for oversight
in anti-corruption, antitrust and anti-money laundering movements. Transparency in
money and banking have frequently focused around a few sentences written by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. In 1914, two years before his time on the high
court began, Brandeis wrote in his book Other People’s Money and How the Bankers
Use It “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman. And publicity has already played an important part in the struggle against
the Money Trust” [1].
Transparency is not new, but when combined with distributed blockchain records,
it becomes a powerful tool for enhancing trust and reputation among participants in a
society. The parallels between Brandeis’ world in 1914 and the world today are striking.
His writings that followed laid out the details of suspect transactions and his proposal
to require additional information. “[T]he disclosure must be real . . . To be effective,
knowledge of the facts must be actually brought home to the investor” [1].
In spite of its secure environment, the cryptocurrency marketplace has experienced
numerous unlawful activities since its inception in 2009. These incidents have caused
its users to lose more than $2 billion in assets [2]. A trust mechanism in the form of a
reputation score for all users operating in a blockchain network could possibly alleviate
some of the unlawful activities that too often negatively impact lawful users. Our
reputation scoring mechanism enables users to identify and avoid risky parties while
making transactions.
In order to mitigate risk, in this paper, we propose a scoring mechanism that
interprets the trustworthiness of a user on the cryptocurrency network. The proposed
score is developed in three steps. The first step is the creation of a blacklist based on
the historical thefts on Bitcoin exchanges. The blacklist provides law-abiding users with
a list of potentially criminal entities with which they should avoid making transactions.
The second step involves a classification task to differentiate the honest users from the
malicious ones who purposefully enter the network to gain an undue financial
advantage. Based on the classification, a metric in the form of a risk score is developed
to indicate a user’s degree of involvement in malicious transactions. The risk score
metric serves as the basis for an improved metric in terms of a reputation score.
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We train multiple machine learning algorithms to classify historical Bitcoin
transactions for identification of any underlying pattern. Our support vector machine
model produces a classification accuracy of 86% accuracy and an F1-score of 0.89
based on two attributes: the number of transactions in a block and the number of inputs
in a transaction. This model has correctly classified all the risky transactions that
occurred in reality.
With a successful classification algorithm, a scoring mechanism is designed to
create a separator between different categories of users. Users with a reputation score
below a certain threshold are identified as potential offenders. We propose to blacklist
these users and restrict them from any further involvement in a cryptocurrency network.
A continuously updated blacklist works as an operating manual for safe transactions on
the Bitcoin network.
The remainder of this paper is structured as described here. Section 2 contains an
overview of blockchain and the current cryptocurrency marketplace. In Section 3, we
describe how to protect cryptocurrency from external attacks. Section 4 outlines the
creation of the blacklist and our scoring approach in detail. We describe the dataset
used in this study in Section 5. Section 6 contains the machine learning algorithms that
we use and the corresponding measurements of the performance of the models. In
Section 7, we present our results and analyses. We examine the ethical implications of
profiling and scoring cryptocurrency users in Section 8. In Section 9, we present
conclusions from our analyses. We highlight future work and potential extensions of
our work in Section 10.

2

Blockchain and the Emergence of Cryptocurrency

Put simply, blockchain is a distributed ledger as shown in Figure 2.1, and
cryptocurrencies are products that operate using a blockchain network. Cryptocurrency
is a medium for exchanging assets between individuals. It is defined as a digital
currency or asset for which transactions are made in an environment secured by a
cryptographic encryption-decryption mechanism. The world’s first cryptocurrency,
known as Bitcoin, was conceptualized by Satoshi Nakamoto, a pseudonym of a person
or a group of people, in 2008 [3]. The platform for cryptocurrency transactions is known
as blockchain which was described by Satoshi as “a peer to peer electronic cash system”
[4].
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Figure 2.1. Standard blockchain network.

In blockchain, transactions are periodically recorded in a chain of blocks and stored
across multiple computers or servers, known as nodes, distributed over the network.
Unlike ledgers in our conventional banking system, blockchain has no single point of
control. The nodes in blockchain cooperate to distribute the complete blockchain to
each node and to verify that new blocks that a node attempts to add to the blockchain
contains valid transactions. Blockchain is developed based on certain characteristics of
a distributed ledger system: cryptography, replication of ledger and immutability.

Figure 2.2. Blockchain security protocol.
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Transactions on a blockchain are made secure with the use of public key ciphers and
secure hash functions which is displayed in Figure 2.2. A public key infrastructure
ensures authenticity and non-repudiation of a transaction. The secure hash functions
ensure the integrity of the transactions and the blocks. When a sender approves a
transaction along with its amount, a fee is paid to the miners who validate the
transaction and add it to the ledger and the recipient’s public key. The transaction is
digitally signed using the sender’s private key and then broadcast to the entire network
on behalf of the sender. Network nodes then validate the authenticity of the transaction
while verifying the sender’s signature. Once verified by a majority of nodes, the
sender’s transaction is ready to be completed and added to a block. After verification,
the recipient receives the asset from the transaction, where the asset is sent encrypted
using the recipient’s public key. After the transaction is complete, the transaction gets
recorded along with other transactions in a block, or a new block is created in the
distributed ledger system, and all the nodes receive a replication of the ledger updated
with the new block appended. With the concept of this replicated ledger, blockchain
maintains transparency, eliminates the chance of dispute and thereby makes the
intermediaries unnecessary. Moreover, the identity of any user is masked with a hashed
communication which ensures anonymity on a blockchain. A typical cryptocurrency
transaction on a blockchain is illustrated in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3. Blockchain transaction cycle.

Another key feature of the blockchain is immutability. After a transaction is added
to the network, it is impossible to erase it. Only a reverse transaction can be added to
nullify the effect of the erroneous or unintentional transaction. This immutable nature
of the blockchain makes the length of the chain ever-growing. The advantages of a
blockchain are summarized in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1. Blockchain advantages.
Advantages
Decentralization

Durability and
robustness
Transparency and
incorruptibility
Security

Description
In contrast to a centralized system, a blockchain is distributed and
replicated across nodes connected in a distributed network. The
network operates peer-to-peer, with the nodes together managing
the blockchain.
Since it is built on the Internet, blockchain automatically inherits
the durability of the Internet. Moreover, since it cannot be
controlled by any single entity or node and there is no single point
of failure, blockchain is expected to operate as a robust system.
Blockchain works using a consensus. A self-auditing system
reconciles transactions in regular intervals. Any block of
transactions is visible to all the participants, and data cannot be
altered once validated and entered in the chain.
With a distributed architecture, a threat of attack on any centralized
point is eliminated. Moreover, the proof-of-work mechanism and
the use of hash functions and public-private keys make the
blockchain very secure from attacks.

As part of the Bitcoin concept, Nakamoto developed the first-ever blockchain
database where the genesis block (the first block) has a timestamp of 18:15:05 GMT
on 3 January 2009 [3]. Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2009, the world economy
has experienced an exponential growth both in terms of market capitalization as well
as in the number of users in the cryptocurrency market. In the past few years, the
cryptocurrency market has experienced an exponential growth in the number of active
users, i.e., in the number of unique public keys in the network. The current number of
users is reported to be more than 23 million and is expected to reach 200 million by
2024 at the present growth rate [5].
The cryptocurrency market is extremely volatile and sensitive to market demand. In
a short span of 9 years, cryptocurrencies have become a multi-billion-dollar
marketplace worldwide. Even though the market was conservative in nature for the first
few years, it started to gain momentum in 2016. By the end of 2017, the total market
value grew exponentially to a record high of over $600 billion due to increasing traffic
into the cryptocurrency market and a surge in demand mostly from China and Japan.
The market has seen growing interest from many institutional investors during this
period and the number of initial coin offerings (ICOs) has increased significantly. The
trend in the global market capitalization of cryptocurrencies is shown in Figure 2.4. As
of Q1 2018, the total cryptocurrency market was valued at slightly more than $400
billion.
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Figure 2.4. Total market capitalization of cryptocurrencies1.

In the years since the introduction of Bitcoin, numerous other cryptocurrencies have
emerged and become part of the cryptocurrency market such as Litecoin, Ethereum,
Ripple, Dash, and Monero. Being the debutant in the industry, Bitcoin had enjoyed
almost a monopoly with over 70% share of the global cryptocurrency market until early
2017. Slowly, other players entered the market, and, to date, there are more than 1,500
types of cryptocurrencies in operation. Since its inception in 2013, Ethereum has
emerged as the main competitor to Bitcoin based on market share. As of April 2018,
Bitcoin captures almost 37% of the cryptocurrency market, followed by Ethereum
(16%), Ripple (8%), and Bitcoin Cash (6%) as shown in Figure 2.5.

1

Data source: CoinMarketCap [https://coinmarketcap.com/]. CoinMarketCap is a source for
data related to cryptocurrencies’ value, their volume and corresponding market capitalization.
Data can be extracted through CoinMarketCap’s public APIs.
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Figure 2.5. Global market share of major cryptocurrencies1.

Exchanges are an essential component in cryptocurrency transactions. Exchanges
are digital trading platforms that offer a marketplace for trading digital assets. Users
can buy or sell cryptocurrencies in exchange for conventional currencies or other
cryptocurrencies. The cryptocurrencies bought through an exchange are stored in
customers’ digital wallets. These wallets store the public and private keys required to
make a successful transaction of cryptocurrency assets and monitors customers’ funds.
The first exchange started to operate in 2010 [6]. By 2018, there were numerous
exchanges operating cryptocurrency trades throughout the world. Bitfinex, Bitstamp,
MtGox, BTCChina, Huboi, OKChain are some of the popular exchanges in the 2018
market. As shown in Table 2.2, from July 2010 to April 2018, three exchanges,
OKChain, Huboi and BTCChina, collectively conducted almost 84% of the total bitcoin
trades, whereas, the oldest exchange, MtGox, conducted only 3.3% of trades in
Bitcoin’s total trade volume. A graphical representation of market share for popular
exchanges is shown in Figure 2.6.
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Table 2.2. Trade volumes and market share for major exchanges (July 2010 – April 2018)2.
Exchange
OKChain
Huboi
BTCChina
Mt.Gox
Bitfinex
Bitstamp
Lakebtc
Bitflyer
Coinbase
Others

BTC Volume
586,565,939.90
544,852,241.80
258,007,950.80
53,861,912.21
45,461,276.87
25,910,946.75
20,767,853.48
15,022,795.60
14,915,059.72
75,147,603.32

Market Share
35.76%
33.21%
15.73%
3.28%
2.77%
1.58%
1.27%
0.92%
0.91%
4.58%

Figure 2.6. Percent of market share for major exchanges (July 2010 – April 2018).

2

Data source: Data.bitcoinity [https://data.bitcoinity.org/markets/volume/all?c=e&t=b]. This
source is managed by Kacper Cieśla, who collects all the data directly from exchanges through
their APIs.
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3

Protecting Assets

A blockchain is designed to be a secure environment. The use of strong cryptography
and secure hashes as security mechanisms enables blockchain to protect digital assets
and their transactions from external attacks. The two most important steps to maintain
security are: i) to protect a user’s private key and ii) secure a user’s digital wallet.
3.1

Protecting User’s Private Key

Users need to ensure that their private key is stored in a secure way and protected from
unauthorized access. If a user’s private key were to become known to another entity,
that entity could execute transactions while masquerading as the user. The net result is
that a user’s stolen identity can be used to spend, or otherwise initiate transactions,
using the user’s cryptocurrency. Consequently, the device that stores the private key
needs to be physically secured and strongly password-protected [7].
3.2

Securing User’s Digital Wallet

Protecting digital wallets is necessary as the wallet stores digital assets. Measures such
as encrypting and maintaining proper backups of the wallet are important. Encryption
ensures protection from unauthorized access to the wallet while a backup becomes
useful to retrieve the wallet in case the device itself is damaged or stolen. A multisignature feature that requires a majority of the wallet holders’ signatures to approve a
transaction can be applied to provide maximum security of a digital wallet. An offline
wallet, also known as cold storage, can be maintained to store the majority of a user’s
assets. As an offline wallet is not connected to a network, it is in no way vulnerable to
a network security breach [7].
3.3

Secured but Vulnerable

All systems have vulnerabilities in the real world, and blockchain is no exception. With
the ever-growing popularity of cryptocurrency trading, there comes a risk of security
breaches and attacks. The cryptocurrency marketplace has experienced several attacks
and thefts on exchanges and digital wallets which caused a considerable loss of funds.
The largest bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, was hacked in early 2014 where bitcoins valued
at approximately €460 million were stolen by hackers [8]. This incident forced Mt. Gox
to file for bankruptcy. In January 2018, it was reported that NEM tokens worth $533
million were stolen from Tokyo-based exchange Coinchek [8]. Some of the largest
Bitcoin thefts are listed in Table 3.1 [9].
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Table 3.1. Largest Bitcoin thefts.
Theft

Timeframe

Loss (BTC)

Bitcoin Savings and Trust

2011–2012

~ 263,024

Silk Road Seizure

Oct-2013

171,955

MyBitcoin Theft

Jul-2011

78,740

Linode Hacks

Mar-2012

46,653

July 2012 Bitcoinica Theft

Jul-2012

40,000

May 2012 Bitcoinica Hack

May-2012

18,548

Allinvain Theft

Jun-2011

25,000

Tony Silk Road Scam

Apr-2012

~ 30,000

Bitfloor Theft

Sep-2012

24,086

Bitomat.pl Loss

Aug-2011

~ 17,000

Bitcoin7 Hack

Oct-2011

~ 15,000

Cdecker Theft

Sep-2012

9,222

Stefan Thomas Loss

Jun-2011

~ 7,000

BTC-E Hack

Jul-2012

~ 4,500

Inputs.io Hack

Oct-2013

~ 4,100

Mass MyBitcoin Thefts

Jun-2011

4,019

Mooncoin Theft

Sep-2011

~ 4,000

Kronos Hack

Unknown

~ 4,000

Bitcoin Rain

2011–2013

~ 4,000

2012 Trojan

Sep – Nov 2012

~ 3,457

Betcoin Theft

Apr-2012

3,172

June 2011 Mt. Gox Incident

Jun-2011

2,643

October 2011 Mt. Gox Loss

Oct-2011

2,609

Andrew Nollan Scam

Feb-2012

2,211

Bit LC Theft

Feb-2013

~ 2,000

Bitcoin Syndicate Theft

Jul-2012

1,853

ZigGap

2012

1,709

Just Dice Incident

Jul-2013

1,300

BTCGuild Incident

Mar-2013

1,254

2012 50BTC Theft

Oct-2012

1,174

Ubitex Scam

2011

1,139

Bitscalper Scam

2012

~ 1,000
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4

Transaction Profiling and Scoring Mechanism

Risk is inherent in any transaction. The potential for fraudulent motives on the part of
participants or the exchange of stolen goods in a transaction always exists. While
certain measures can be taken to reduce such risks, invariably, each party places trust
in the other to fulfill their end of the transaction. In order to mitigate this risk, we
propose a three-stage solution. First, we create a blacklist of users that are known to be
associated with one or more of the major thefts on Bitcoin exchanges. Second, we use
classification techniques to profile all transactions based on the potential risk associated
with them. Finally, a scoring mechanism is proposed as a measure of trustworthiness at
the user level with the aid of the profiled transactions.
4.1

The Blacklist

Blacklisting is one of the primary techniques that organizations use to protect the public
from financial scams, malicious web pages, and many other mischiefs on the Internet
[10]. For example, SpamCop, an email spam reporting service, uses this approach for
listing the IP addresses of entities who send spam. The SafeBrowsing API, a Google
service, uses blacklists for listing URLs that lead to malicious web pages. Invaluement,
an anti-spam service, employs blacklisting on IP addresses or domain names that are
involved in scams.
In our approach, creating a blacklist is the action of grouping entities with whom
law-abiding citizens should distrust and avoid making contact. These entities should be
known in order to properly educate and protect users. Our blacklist is continuously
updated with known fraudulent entities so that users can check before engaging in
potentially harmful interactions. Once the entity is found, the scoring mechanism can
generate a warning to let the user know that this entity is on the blacklist and cannot be
trusted. As such, a blacklist provides the benefit of lookup efficiency [10]. One key
limitation of the blacklist is that it operates in a reactive fashion. The list is updated
only after an entity has been found to be associated with an illegal activity. However,
until then, other entities are vulnerable to the malicious intentions of the criminal entity.
For Bitcoin transactions, a baseline is required to determine which addresses are
associated with illegal activities. Certain transactions are linked to criminal activities;
hence, the user that made the transaction should not be trusted. Events such as the Mt.
Gox hacks, May 2012 Bitcoinica Hack, BTC-E Hack and the Allinvain Theft are all
instances in which certain IP addresses were used to commit illegal activities. An
address associated with any of these hacks is placed on a blacklist. If a user transacts
with one of the addresses on this blacklist, then that user becomes riskier for others to
engage in transactions. For example, if User A is associated with the Mt. Gox hacks
and User B transacts with User A, then the riskiness associated with doing business
with User B increases. The blacklist makes this information publicly available.
Therefore, if User C wants to send Bitcoins to User B, they could see that User B has
done transactions with the blacklisted User A in the past; this may make User C hesitate
to transact with User B.

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol1/iss3/5
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4.2

Transaction Profiling and Classification

Every transaction has a specific pattern and this pattern recognition is the key to
differentiate between “risky” and “non-risky” transactions. Our blacklist plays a crucial
role here. We leverage the information gained from past transactions associated with
this blacklist and try to identify similarities between new transactions and an established
prototype. Any such similarity would explain the new transaction’s propensity to be a
risky one. Identifying this level of propensity leads to a successful classification of risky
and non-risky transactions.
We use a variety of different machine learning techniques that can perform this
classification task successfully. Transactions are analyzed based on a set of quantifiable
characteristics and are then classified into specific sub-classes with the help of a
distance function. A successful profiling largely depends on the degree of accuracy in
classification. Once transactions are classified, they are labeled as either of the
prototyped classes.
4.3

The Scoring Mechanism

It is often argued that lack of regulations makes the cryptocurrency network vulnerable
to fraudulent activities. This prompts us to introduce a scoring mechanism that will
enhance trust on cryptocurrency transactions between users. First, a metric in terms of
“risk score” has been conceptualized by which a user can gauge the relative potential
risk for any future transaction with a fellow user in the network. The risk score,
developed at the user level, is defined as a simple ratio of the number of transactions
classified as “risky” from a user to the total number of transactions done by the same
user. The risk score, denoted by R, is given by the following formula:
𝑅=

𝑟
,
𝑇

(1)

where r represents the total number of transactions classified as “risky” by a user and
T represents the total number of transactions by the same user. As defined, the risk
score ranges from 0 to 1 with higher scores indicating a user’s higher engagement in
risky transactions. If a user’s risk score is 0, then this particular user has never been
associated with any type of malicious activity involving cryptocurrency. A pictorial
explanation of our risk scoring mechanism is displayed in Figure 4.1. In this instance,
Dan has the lowest risk score and can be considered the safest user to engage in a
transaction with whereas Tim should be avoided because of his extremely high-risk
score. Similarly, we can see Bob and Alice are safer entities to transact with than Trudy.
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Figure 4.1. Risk scoring examples.

This risk score has few limitations. Primarily this scoring method does not define a
score for new users, i.e., users with no prior transaction history in a cryptocurrency
network. After making the first transaction, a user’s risk score can suddenly move up
to 1 (the maximum possible value) or go down to 0 (the minimum possible value) given
the transaction is classified as “risky” or “non-risky,” respectively. Moreover, this
scoring mechanism can identify a user with a significantly greater number of “nonrisky” transactions as more vulnerable than a user with a smaller number of “non-risky”
transactions. For example, if a user has 2 out of a total 50 transactions labeled as “risky”,
the risk score is calculated as 0.04. On the contrary, if someone makes the first
transaction as “non-risky”, the corresponding risk score becomes 0, which is better than
0.04. This makes the first user less credible as compared to the second user who is yet
to make a considerable footprint in a cryptocurrency network.
To counter these issues with the risk scoring mechanism, we introduce a revised score:
a “reputation score”. This reputation score, denoted by S, is defined as,
𝑆={

0, 𝑇 = 0
𝑟

𝑇 ∗ (1 − ) , 𝑇 > 0

,

(2)
(1)

𝑇

where R represents the total number of transactions by a user, which are classified as
“risky” and T represents the total number of transactions by the same user. This
proposed reputation score has two components: i) risk score (r/T as previously defined)
and ii) the total number of transactions (T). This metric ranges from 0 to T and provides
users the opportunities to start from 0 and build their score with every legitimate (nonrisky) transaction. According to this metric, higher reputation scores are better for
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gauging trust and legitimate business. Table 4.1 shows reputation scores for values of
r and T ranging from 0 to 100. Figure 4.2 illustrates different hypothetical scenarios
under which a user’s risk and reputation score can manifest themselves.
Table 4.1. Reputation scoring.
Total Number of
Transactions (T)
0
1
2
3
4
5
.
.
.
99
100

Number of Risky Transactions (r)
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
.
.
.
99
100

1
0
1
2
3
4
.
.
.
98
99

2
0
1
2
3
.
.
.
97
98

3
0
1
2
.
.
.
96
97

4
0
1
.
.
.
95
96

5
0
.
.
.
94
95

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

99
.
.
.
0
1

100
.
.
.
0

Figure 4.2. Risk and reputation scores for hypothetical users.
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5

Blockchain Data

To profile transactions in a cryptocurrency network and classify them based on the
potential risk involved, transactional data for Bitcoin with details on the sender,
receiver, transaction time and amount are required. For this purpose, we leverage a
database on historical Bitcoin transactions from the ELTE Bitcoin Project 3 . This
database provides block- and transaction-level details for every Bitcoin transaction
recorded through February 9, 2018. The database contains 508,241 blocks and the total
number of unique transactions is 303,641,057. We join all attributes together to create
a single dataset containing all information without any duplication of information. The
attributes are listed in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. ELTE Bitcoin dataset attribute descriptions.
Attribute
blockID
hash

block_timestamp
n_txs
txID
n_inputs
n_outputs
input_seq
prev_txID
prev_output_seq
addrID
sum
output_seq
address

userID

Description
Unique identifier for each block in bitcoin
transaction history
An encrypted hex value for block address

Current time in seconds calculated based on
1970-01-01-00:00:00 as starting time
Total number of transactions registered in a
block
Unique identifier for each transaction
Number of inputs in one transaction
Number of outputs in one transaction
Sequence for inputs in a specific transaction
Unique identifier for the previous
transaction
Previous output sequence for the output
prior to the current output
Unique integer value for each address
The total input amount in a transaction
which is defined in Satoshis (1e-9 BTC)
Sequence for outputs in a specific
transaction
Unique identifier of 26-35 alphanumeric
characters, beginning with the number 1 or
3, that represents a possible destination for
payments
Unique identifier for a user

Example
130560
00000000000015b9
b2b91c82f5d95e745
6b754cc188e58
1307983943
11
718648
478
2
209
718648
0
60412
5000000000
1
1Fq6Ahjkm69zHob
ctKCRdGYS25nJir
qrLe
38094

3

Data source, [http://www.vo.elte.hu/bitcoin/default.htm]. ELTE project was conducted at the
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary under the supervision of Prof. István Csabai and
Prof. Gábor Vattay. Three PhD students, Dániel Kondor, Márton Pósfai and János Szüle, worked
on this project. The objective of this project was to analyze large network datasets to study the
navigability of the network of Twitter users and other large-scale studies using Twitter messages.
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We assign a risk factor, binary in nature, on the transactions in this dataset. The
transactions related to any historical Bitcoin thefts are assigned a risk level of 1 whereas
all other transactions are assigned a risk factor of 0. Finally, a sampled set of
transactions are selected from the complete and consolidated list of Bitcoin transactions
and were considered for analysis and model development. The sampling is designed in
such a way that all the historical thefts are selected in the sample and the non-thefts are
selected randomly from the transactions without any theft history. This sampling design
results in a dataset with a total of 8,109 data points for analysis with 2,172 transactions
with risk level 1 and 5,937 transactions with risk level 0.

6

Machine Learning Approach

This section describes several different machine learning approaches that are
implemented in order to classify whether a transaction is a risky or not. Three
classification algorithms are trained and cross-validated: Random Forest, K-Nearest
Neighbor, and Support-Vector Machine.
In order to validate our models, the data are split into 80% train and 20% test sets.
Then, baseline models are created with all 10 variables: block_timestamp, block_n_txs,
n_inputs, input_sum, output_sum, n_outputs, output_seq and input_seq. After the
baseline models are created, feature engineering is performed in order to fine-tune the
models.
6.1

Feature Engineering

Feature engineering is performed after the data are cleaned and ready for model
building. In this process, domain knowledge of the data facilitates the development of
models with high classification accuracies. Feature engineering guides the researcher
in reducing the number of variables that are used as predictors in the models.
6.2

Cross-validation

A well-known issue in predictive modeling is overfitting. This refers to over sensitivity
of a model toward a specific dataset on which it has been trained. Cross-validation
works as a remedy to this issue. This requires the full dataset to be split into two separate
subsets, known as the train and test sets. We split our data randomly into an 80:20 ratio
for train and test sets. This implies that we train our models on 80% of the observations
and validate the models on the remaining 20%.
We use 10-fold cross-validation which returns 10 stratified randomized folds that are
made by preserving the percentage of samples for each feature. We use a Stratified
ShuffleSplit cross-validator from Python’s scikit-learn library for this purpose.
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6.3

Model Evaluation

An essential classification model evaluation tool is a confusion matrix. In order to
evaluate each model, certain metrics are calculated. The confusion matrix is an N-byN matrix, where N is the number of classes being classified [11]. The columns and rows
of the matrix list the number of instances as actual class versus predicted class, shown
in Figure 6.1. The overall accuracy can be calculated as,
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
= 1 − 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 .
𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁

(3)

Figure 6.1. Confusion Matrix.

Highlight the issue of overfitting True positives are data points labeled as positive that
are actually positive whereas false positives are data points labeled as positive that are
actually negative. True negatives are data points labeled as negative that are actually
negative whereas false negatives are data points labeled as negative that are actually
positive.
Metrics such as precision, recall, F1-score and support are also used to evaluate the
performance of a model in predicting unforeseen outcomes. Precision is the proportion
of data points that the model assigns as true positives (negatives) that are actually true
positives (negatives). It can be calculated as:
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑁
(
).
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁

(4)

Recall is the model’s ability to find every data point of interest. It can be calculated as:
𝑇𝑃
.
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(5)

It is important to note that when recall is increased, precision is decreased, and vice
versa. When combining precision and recall the result is an F1-score. An F1-score is
the harmonic mean of precision and recall which can be given by:
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2∗

𝑝∗𝑟
,
𝑝+𝑟

(6)

where p is precision and r is recall. The harmonic mean is used because it strictly deals
with extreme values. To create a balanced classification model with the optimal balance
of recall and precision, the F1-score should be utilized [11]. Support is the total number
of occurrences of each class.
6.4

Random Forest

Random Forest is an ensemble method for classification or regression. We use this
method for classification. The Random Forest randomly selects k features from m total
features, where k < m. Among the k features, it calculates the node d using the best split
point. Then, it splits the node into child nodes using the best split. This is repeated until
l number of nodes has been reached. Finally, the forest is built by repeating the previous
steps n number of times to create n number of trees. The results are obtained by the
modal value of categories obtained by individual trees.

Figure 6.2. Random Forest tree.

6.5

K-Nearest Neighbor

K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) is a non-parametric method for classification or regression.
We use this method for classification. In classification, the unknown is classified as the
class with the majority of the members. Results of the unknown observation is
determined by the average value of the K nearest neighbors of the unknown. K
represents the number of data points considered for the classification.
The KNN method implements two search types: neighbor search and radius search.
When given a set x of n points and a distance function, the search finds the K closest
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points in x to a single point or set of points y. The distance function used in this paper
is the Minikowski distance,
𝑛−1

𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = (∑
𝑖=0

1/𝑝

|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |𝑝 )

.

(7)

If p is equal to 1, (7) is equivalent to the Manhattan distance; if p is equal to 2, (7) is
the Euclidean distance.

Figure 6.3. KNN classification.

6.6

Support-Vector Machine

Support vector machine (SVM) creates a hyperplane for high dimensional or a set of
hyperplanes for classification. SVM uses a “one vs. one” approach for multiclass
classification. In a 2-dimensional space, the hyperplane becomes a straight or curved
line. The line with the maximum margin forms the support-vector. This approach trains
n × (n − 1) × 2 = b ,

(8)

where n is the number of classifiers and b are the separate binary classifiers. Each binary
classifier is trained using examples of two variables that are being classified. The test
sample, t, is applied to each of the separate binary classifiers. Then, each binary
classifier votes for the variable it is trying to classify. Finally, the test sample receives
the label c, where c is the y variable receiving the highest number of votes.
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Figure 6.4. SVM classification.

7

Results

In this section, we summarize the results and visualizations of our analyses. The
accuracy of each model, a comparison of the models and the split methods are
presented. Model performance metrics are displayed to assess how well each method
performs in classifying transactions into their respective categories.
7.1

Random Forest Results

We train a baseline model on all 10 variables with an 80% training and 20% for testing
split of our data. Table 7.1 displays the Random Forest metrics for the baseline model.
This model has a classification accuracy of 100%, as shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Table
7.1 displays the confusion matrix for the baseline model. There were 1,193 observations
classified as a non-theft and 429 observations classified as a theft. There are no
misclassified observations. This resembles the model accuracy of 100%. Table 7.2
displays the precision, recall and F1-score of the baseline model. These three model
performance metrics are 1, which is the highest value possible.
Table 7.1. Random Forest baseline confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1
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0

Predicted: 1
0
429

21

SMU Data Science Review, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 3, Art. 5

Table 7.2. Random Forest baseline metrics.

0
1
Average
Accuracy

Precision
1.00
1.00
1.00

Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00

F1-score
1.00
1.00
1.00
100.00%

Support
1,193
429
1,622

Figure 7.1. Random Forest baseline model feature importance.

Figure 7.1 displays the significant features in the model: block_timestamp, input_add
ID, output_addrID, block_n_txs, n_inputs, input_sum, output_sum, n_outputs,
output_seq and input_seq. We ran a reduced Random Forest model based on the top 8
features. Variables related to address ID’s are dropped from the model as they are used
as identifiers. Table 7.3 displays the Random Forest metrics for the second model. This
model has a classification average accuracy of 100%, as shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
An accuracy of 100% indicates that the algorithm classifies all thefts and non-theft
correctly. Table 7.3 displays the confusion matrix for the second model. There were
1,193 observations classified as a non-theft and 429 observations classified as a theft.
There are no misclassified observations. This resembles the model accuracy of 100%.
Table 7.6 displays the precision, recall and F1-score of the second model. These three
model performance metrics are 1, which is the highest value possible.
Table 7.3. Random Forest second model confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1
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Table 7.4. Random Forest second model metrics.

0
1
Average
Accuracy

Precision
1.00
1.00
1.00

Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00

F1-score
1.00
1.00
1.00
100.00%

Support
1,193
429
1,622

Figure 7.2. Random Forest second model feature importance.

The important features (variables) are displayed in Figure 7.2 for the second model.
The variables block_timestamp, block_n_txs, n_inputs, input_sum, output_sum,
n_outputs, output_seq and input_seq. The data are highly skewed towards the number
of non-thefts, which can be the reason our model cannot identify the thefts out of all
the non-thefts. We further reduce the number of features to 7.
The third model is without block_timestamp. Table 7.6 displays the Random Forest
metrics for the third model. This model has a classification accuracy of 99.81%. The
precision, recall and F1-score of the third model are close to 1. Table 7.5 displays the
confusion matrix for the third model. This model misclassifies only 3 out of 1,193
instances where no actual theft occurred. There are no observations misclassified as a
theft.
Table 7.5. Random Forest third model confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1
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0

Predicted: 1
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Table 7.6. Random Forest third model metrics.

0
1
Average
Accuracy

Precision
1.00
0.99
1.00

Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00

F1-score
1.00
0.89
1.00
99.81%

Support
1,193
429
1,622

Figure 7.3. Random Forest third model feature importance.

The important features (variables) are displayed in Figure 7.3 for the third model.
The variables block_timestamp, block_n_txs, n_inputs, input_sum, output_sum,
n_outputs, output_seq and input_seq are the most important features used in the third
Random Forest model.
7.2

K-Nearest Neighbor Results

We train a baseline KNN model on all explanatory variables with an 80/20 split of the
data. Table 7.8 displays the KNN metrics for the baseline model. This model has a
classification accuracy of 99.96%. Table 7.7 displays the confusion matrix for the
baseline model. There are 8 non-thefts that were classified as a theft and 10 thefts that
were classified as a non-theft. The misclassifications are minimal for the baseline
model.
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Table 7.7. KNN baseline confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1

Predicted: 0
1,185
10

Predicted: 1
8
419

Table 7.8. KNN baseline model metrics.

0
1
Average
Accuracy

Precision
0.99
0.98
0.99

Recall
0.99
0.98
0.99

F1-score
0.99
0.98
0.99

Support
1,193
429
1,622

99.96%

To determine the optimal number of neighbors, we iterate through different values
of K ranging from 1 to 50. Figure 7.4 displays the number of neighbors against the
misclassification errors. This reveals the optimal number of neighbors. The optimal K
is determined by the lowest mean squared error, which happens to be 1 in this case.

Figure 7.4. Number of neighbors vs. misclassification error.

Once the baseline is established, we perform feature engineering in order to explore
how well the KNN model classifies with fewer features. The optimal number of
neighbors is used along with feature engineering. The second KNN model is trained
with only 8 features: block_timestamp, block_n_txs, n_inputs, input_sum, output_sum,
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n_outputs, output_seq and input_seq. We further reduce the number of features in order
to provide a more powerful model.
Table 7.9. KNN second model confusion matrix with optimal number of neighbors.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1

Predicted: 0
1,184
10

Predicted: 1
9
419

Table 7.10. KNN second model metrics with optimal number of neighbors.

0
1
Average
Accuracy

Precision
0.99
0.98
0.99

Recall
0.99
0.98
0.99

F1-score
0.99
0.98
0.99

Support
1,193
429
1,622

98.83%

Table 7.10 displays the KNN metrics for the second model with the optimal number
of neighbors. This model has a classification accuracy of 98.83%. The precision, recall,
and F1-score are all high, close to 1. There are 9 non-thefts that are classified as theft
and 10 thefts that are classified as non-thefts, as shown in Table 7.9.
The third model was trained with only two features: block_n_txs and n_inputs. Table
7.12 displays the KNN metrics for the third model with optimal number of neighbors.
With only two features, the third model was able to make correct classifications similar
to the baseline and second model. Therefore, block_n_txs and n_inputs are important
in the classification of thefts and non-thefts. This model has a classification accuracy
of 98.83%. There are two non-thefts that are classified as thefts and no thefts that are
classified as non-thefts, as shown in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11. KNN third model confusion matrix with optimal number of neighbors.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1

Predicted: 0
1,190
0

Predicted: 1
2
427

Table 7.12. KNN third model metrics with optimal number of neighbors.

0
1
Average
Accuracy

Precision
1.00
0.99
1.00

https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol1/iss3/5

Recall
1.00
1.00
1.00

F1-score
1.00
0.99
1.00

Support
1,193
429
1,622

99.88%
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Figure 7.5. KNN third model classification results.

Figure 7.5 displays the results of the third model. The orange shaded areas are the
thefts and the blue shaded areas are the non-thefts. Likewise, the orange triangles
represent the transactions classified as thefts whereas the blue squares represent the
transactions classified as non-thefts. Blue squares that lie in the orange shaded area and
the orange triangles that lie in the blue shaded area represent the misclassified
transactions. This figure displays how well the Random Forest model performed when
classifying thefts and non-thefts.
7.3

Support-Vector Machine Results

We train a baseline model on all 10 variables with an 80/20 split. Table 7.14 displays
the SVM metrics for the baseline model. This model has a classification accuracy of
97.76%. There are 2 non-thefts that were classified as a theft and no thefts that were
classified as a non-theft, as shown in Table 7.13.
Table 7.13. SVM baseline confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1
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1,186
0

Predicted: 1
2
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Table 7.14. SVM baseline metrics.

0
1
Average
Average Accuracy

Precision
0.86
1.00
0.89

Recall
1.00
0.54
0.88

F1-score
0.92
0.70
0.86
97.76%

Support
1,188
434
1,622

Once the baseline is established, we perform feature engineering in order to explore
how well the SVM model classifies with fewer features. A second SVM model is
trained with only 8 variables: block_timestamp, block_n_txs, n_inputs, input_sum,
output_sum, n_outputs, output_seq and input_seq. These are the top 8 features in our
data set.
Table 7.15. SVM second model confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1

Predicted: 0
1,187
307

Predicted: 1
1
127

Table 7.16. SVM second model metrics.

0
1
Average
Average Accuracy

Precision
0.79
0.99
0.85

Recall
1.00
0.29
0.81

F1-score
0.89
0.45
0.77
82.66%

Support
1,188
434
1,622

Table 7.16 displays the SVM metrics for the second model. This model has a
classification accuracy of 82.66%. There is 1 non-theft that is classified as a theft and
307 thefts that are classified as a non-theft, as shown in Table 7.15.
A third SVM model is trained and tested with only block_n_txs and n_inputs. Table
7.18 displays the SVM metrics for the third model. This model has a classification
accuracy of 85.96%. There are 189 non-thefts that are classified as a theft and 0 thefts
that are classified as a non-theft, as shown in Table 7.17.
Table 7.17. SVM third model confusion matrix.

Actual: 0
Actual: 1
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Predicted: 0
999
0

Predicted: 1
189
434
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Table 7.18. SVM third model metrics.

0
1
Average
Average Accuracy

Precision
1.00
0.70
0.92

Recall
0.84
1.00
0.88

F1-score
0.91
0.82
0.89
85.96%

Support
1,188
434
1,622

Figure 7.6. SVM third model classification results.

Figure 7.6 displays the results of the third SVM model. The orange shaded areas are
the thefts and the blue shaded areas are the non-thefts. The orange triangles represent
the thefts classified values whereas the blue squares represent the non-theft classified
values. Blue squares that lie in the orange shaded area and the orange triangles that lie
in the blue shaded area represent the misclassified transactions. This figure displays
how well the Random Forest model performed when classifying thefts and non-thefts.
7.4

Model Comparison

In our study, we have used machine learning techniques to classify transactions based
on their propensity of risk. We start with a baseline model with all relevant features
followed by reduced models trained with key features selected from the baseline model.
Both the Random Forest and KNN methods provide almost a perfect classification for
the baseline model as well as the reduced models. Our reduced models are built based
on the top 8, top 7 and top 2 features identified from the baseline Random Forest model.
None of these models have misclassified a risky transaction as a non-risky one.
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The accuracies and F1-scores for all these models are presented in Figure 7.7 and
Figure 7.8, respectively. The models with the least number of features are preferred, as
they are easier to interpret. Random Forest and KNN have achieved more than 98%
accuracy, regardless of the number of features considered in the model. On the contrary,
SVM is dependent on the number of predictors. The accuracy for SVM has dropped
from 98% to 83% when 8 of the 10 predictors are selected. The baseline model
misclassified two of the non-risky transactions but classified all risky transactions
correctly whereas the top-8 model fails to capture risky transactions in 70% of cases,
307 times out of 434 in total.
The drop in accuracy prompts us to retrain SVM based on the top 2 important
predictors: block_n_txs and n_inputs. This SVM model provides a realistic
classification accuracy of 86%. This model gives a high F1-score of 0.89. An increased
accuracy level with fewer predictors indicates the presence of factors that have a
negative influence on the classification.

Figure 7.7. Model comparison for accuracy.
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Figure 7.8. Model comparison for F1-score.

8

Ethical Discussion

The Association for Computing Machinery’s (ACM) code of ethics contains 24
imperatives by which all professionals should adhere [12]. Among them, “Avoid harm
to others” and “Respect the privacy of others” are arguably the most relevant to trust in
cryptocurrency transactions.
Our reputation scoring methodology has the potential to do harm to law-abiding
cryptocurrency users. No machine learning model is 100% accurate. As a result, our
machine learning models can overstate a user’s frequency of transactions with entities
associated with a theft of an exchange. This would make other users less likely to
engage in transactions with such a user, despite the user’s non-malicious intentions and
perfectly legal transactions. Consequently, undue harm would be caused to that user by
restricting their ability to do business in the marketplace.
Additionally, our approach arguably restricts the privacy of cryptocurrency users.
Trust in the presence of anonymity requires an examination of the company users keep.
By developing and publicizing a reputation score for each user, we are revealing
information about their association with individuals or entities that engage in unlawful
activities. While the identity of each user is not explicitly disclosed, a single number
that represents one’s reputation score, on the surface, says much about the parties –
whether good, bad or neutral – with which a user makes transactions. This privacy
concern becomes especially salient if a user would prefer not to share the identities of
the users they have transacted with in the past. After all, it is the right of an individual
to conceal most types of personal information from the general public.
The publication of a reputation score, such as the one we present, generates
additional questions that may have not come to light previously. For example, would a
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cryptocurrency user have the option to “opt out” of their reputation score being
viewable by all other users? If so, how many users could realistically be expected to
remove their public key from the risk scoring list? If the vast majority of users opt out,
that severely reduces the usefulness of the risk scoring concept. If users are not given
opt-out opportunity, that raises the concern of the aforementioned privacy restriction.
Moreover, who or what would be in charge of storing and managing our reputation
score database? If an independent third-party is responsible, would that undermine the
decentralized nature of the cryptocurrency marketplace? These are just some of the
many questions that would need to be carefully answered before our reputation scoring
methodology could be ethically and practically implemented in the marketplace.

9

Conclusions

Based on the available Bitcoin transactions, we implement a successful classification
mechanism to differentiate risky transactions from non-risky ones. A successful
classification leads to a reliable scoring mechanism. Our reputation scoring mechanism,
which is practical and easy to calculate, is a foundation for enhancing trust in the
cryptocurrency marketplace. After transactions are classified, all the users identified by
their respective public keys are assigned a reputation score based on their involvement
in risky transactions from their full transaction basket to date. Consistent legitimate
transactions of cryptocurrency assets provide ample opportunity for users to build a
credible reputation over time. However, this reputation can be damaged with their
frequent involvement in risky transactions. Users meeting a certain transaction
threshold with a low reputation score are blacklisted. The blacklist, updated
continuously, works as a guideline for making safe Bitcoin transactions.
The success of a financial transaction depends largely on trust which can be ensured
by the users on either side of a transaction. In a cryptocurrency marketplace in which
intermediaries are non-existent, a self-attestation mechanism in the form of a reputation
score offers a viable alternative to enhance trust. It empowers users with the ability to
carefully consider others before transacting with them.

10

Future Work

In our present solution, we develop a reputation scoring mechanism that is
predominantly built on the characteristics of transactions. The ever-changing nature of
human behavior is reflected in users’ transactional patterns. This requires a continuous
monitoring of our classification models to accommodate the necessary amendments
based on the ongoing inflow of data.
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Anonymity in blockchain is a double-edged sword. The current mechanism is not
able to track whether a criminal purposefully creates multiple dummy transactions to
improve their reputation score. Moreover, multiple user ID’s by the same user are also
approved in the current structure of the blockchain network. This creates a further
opportunity for criminals to take advantage of their anonymity. We aim to replace our
scoring metric with a more sophisticated one in the future to address these limitations.
Blacklisting the stolen coins is another action suggested in this regard.
This work may also be extended to study the impact of additional factors such as
whether a transaction is pooled or an exchange in our classification of transactions into
risky or non-risky categories. A pooled transaction is of a newly minted coin that goes
to the same input address. These types of transactions can be identified by the output
location. Typically, an exchange transaction will have an output to some third-party
website. The website matbea.net is a popular source from which to collect this
information.
Educating participants in cryptocurrency transactions on the advantages of our
reputation scoring approach is key for blockchain-based marketplaces to become more
trustworthy in the future. While adoption will undoubtedly be slow, pilot testing of our
method on real-world cryptocurrency transactions would allow entities to gauge how
effective our reputation scoring mechanism is in empowering users with a self-guided
trust. An advanced analysis to quantify the impact of this scoring mechanism in
cryptocurrency marketplaces would reveal further possible improvements with a viable
go-to-market solution for the industry.
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